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THE NEW THRUST OF THE ANTIMERGER ACT:
THE BROWN SHOE DECISION
Bryce J. Jones*
In a landmark antitrust decision, the Supreme Court has upheld the judg-
ment of a federal district court that the 1956 acquisition by Brown Shoe Com-
pany of the G. R. Kinney Company violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.'
The merger between Brown, the nation's fourth largest manufacturer and the
third largest retailer of shoes, and Kinney, a partially integrated retailer ranking
seventh in the industry, was held to be illegal by the court at two levels: the
vertical tie between Brown's manufacturing units and Kinney's retail outlets
threatened competition at the manufacturing level, and the horizontal combina-
tion of retail outlets posed a threat to competition in the numerous markets in
which the two companies have retail outlets.' Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, provides:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly.3
M.S., Ph.D., St. Louis University; Assoc. Professor of Economics, St. Joseph's 'College.
1 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294 (1962), affirming 179 F. Supp. 721
(E.D. Mo. 1959).
2 Contrary to some opinion, the District Court held that the merger of manufacturing
units did not violate the Clayton Act. In view of the high court's approach to the horizontal
merger at the retail level, it is likely that the increase in Brown's manufacturing share from 4.0
to 4.5 per cent would also have been declared illegal, had the Government appealed from this
determination of the District Court.
3 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1958).
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Despite the large number of cases brought under section 7,4 the Brown decision
marks the first time that the Supreme Court has fully interpreted the antimerger
law; and though it is hazardous to speculate on the extent to which any deci-
sion will establish precedent, especially in the field of antitrust where the fact
pattern varies so widely from case to case, the thrust of the Brown decision is
so unmistakable that it promises to broaden the scope and to alter the standard
of illegality of the antimerger law.
The plan of this paper is as follows: sections one and two deal, respectively,
with the vertical and horizontal aspects of the Brown-Kinney merger and the
Brown Court's approach to these issues as seen against the background of
recent merger law; section three discusses the problem of market definition with
particular reference to the issues in the Brown case; section four explores the
implications for the future of the Brown decision; and the final section sum-
marizes the major issues of the decision.
1. The Vertical Aspect of the Merger
Until 1961, it was settled law that a vertical arrangement that forecloses
competitors from a substantial market violates the Clayton Act.' Both Standard
Oil of California v. United States,6 involving Standard's exclusive dealer con-
tracts, and the du Pont-General Motors case, 7 involving du Pont's partial stock
ownership of General Motors, made it clear that a showing that a substantial
market is foreclosed to other firms obviates a demonstration of the anticompeti-
tive effects of a vertical arrangement. The precise meaning of a "substantial
market," however, was uncertain. The only relevant precedents were section 3
cases, and these contained both an absolute and relative definition of substan-
tiality: in International Salt Co. v. United States,8 $500,000 in annual pur-
chases required by a tying contract was deemed substantial; in the Standard
Stations case, the share of the market - 6.7 per cent - covered by exclusive
dealer contracts was regarded as substantial.9
An indication that the so-called quantitative substantiality doctrine of the
Standard Stations case would be modified came in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co., a section 3 case involving requirements contracts.1" The con-
tracts, calling for the purchase of $128 million of coal per year, were held illegal
by the lower courts because the contracts involved substantial sums.1 In
reversing the decision, the Supreme Court profoundly altered the substan-
4 From 1950 to Oct. 1, 1962, 106 cases have been initiated. The disposition of these cases
is summarized in STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT CoMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION, 19-21 (1962).
5 The term vertical arrangement covers tying, requirements, and exclusive dealer contracts
and mergers between firms which are in a buying and selling relationship. Tying, requirements,
and exclusive dealer contracts are proscribed by section 3 of the Clayton Act, vertical mergers
are covered by section 7 of the Clayton Act. Under both section 3 and section 7 these arrange-
ments are illegal if they may "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."
6 337 U. S. 293 (1949).
7 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586 (1957).
8 332 U. S. 392, 396 (1947).
9 Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U. S. at 314.
10 365 U. S. 320 (1961).
11 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766, 772 (6th Cir. 1960), affirm-
ing 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
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tiality doctrine. The Court ruled that "a mere showing that the contract itself in-
volves a substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little consequence."' 1
The high Court repeated the Standard Stations ruling that such contracts are
illegal if competition is foreclosed from a substantial share of the market; but
the Court went on to state that to determine substantiality it is necessary to
examine the relative strength of the firms, the share of the market involved, and
the effects, present and future, which the contracts would have on competition.
The Brown Court took a similar approach. It held that the market share
foreclosed by a vertical arrangement is seldom determinative of legality: in
order to determine whether a market foreclosure is substantial, the vertical
arrangement must be viewed in the light of economic and historical forces.
Taken as one, the two decisions represent a categorical rejection of the quanti-
tative substantiality doctrine. And if the judiciary employs the approach to
substantiality taken by the Tampa Court, the legality of vertical mergers will
turn on several factors, including a showing of the probable effect of the merger
on competition. Such a rule-of-reason approach would meet the major criticism
of the quantitative substantiality doctrine: that it fails to discriminate between
mergers that harm the competitive process and those that do not.13
In determining the substantiality of the foreclosure, the Brown Court
considered three economic and historical factors: the size of the foreclosure,
industry trends, and the nature and purpose of the vertical arrangement.
The Kinney market share which was acquired in the merger was small
enough - 1.2 per cent of national retail sales by dollar volume and 1.6 per
cent of total pairage - that even by the Standard Stations test the merger
would have been permitted. Kinney, however, was the largest nonintegrated
retailer in the nation, and the Court noted that "no merger between a manu-
facturer and an independent retailer could involve a larger potential market
foreclosure."' 4 The record shows that in 1955 Kinney purchased shoes from
66 suppliers and at least five of these were independent manufacturers who
sold more than 40 per cent of their output to Kinney; and the evidence clearly
indicated that even though Brown supplied only 8 per cent of Kinney's needs
it intended to increase its share of the Kinney market. The weakness of this
argument is pointed up in the Brown decision: Chief Justice Warren's fear
that Kinney retail outlets would be foreclosed to Brown's manufacturing rivals
was neatly matched by Justice Harlan's fear that some of Kinney's rivals would
be precluded by the merger from buying shoes from Brown."
Instead of emphasizing the size of the merger or its competitive impact,
the Court used its broadened approach to substantiality to raise the small share
acquired by Brown to a higher power - an illegal power - by viewing it in
the light of a "trend toward concentration." In effect, the Court ruled that a
small share foreclosed achieves an anticompetitive effect if similar small shares
12 365 U. S. at 329.
13 HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 68-70 (1957).
14 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. at 331-32.
15 Bork noted a similar matching of foreclosures in A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc., 3 TRADE
REo. REP. 1 28694 (1960), aff'd, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962). Bork, Anticompetitive Enforce-
ment Doctrines under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 39 TExAs L. REv. 832, 836 (1961).
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have been foreclosed by industry members in the past, and the dynamics of the
process indicate that other shares will be foreclosed in the future.
It is to be noted that this version of incipient trends differs from the more
widely discussed version: the case of minute acquisitions by a single firm. Both
versions were present in the lower court's decision, but the latter version is not
prominent in the Supreme Court decision.
It is not intuitively clear how an industry trend toward vertical integration
can damage competition. In the case of a series of horizontal or vertical mergers
by a single firm, it is clear enough that if the process is repeated often enough
competition will ultimately be harmed."6 This is not necessarily true in the
case of a multi-firm vertical integration movement: if 500 shoe manufacturers
acquire all of the retail outlets, competition will still thrive at both the retailing
and manufacturing level.
Presumably, then, the danger lies not in a trend toward vertical integration
as such but rather in a trend which is restricted to only a few members of the
industry. The theory appears to run as follows: if a few manufacturers obtain
an increasing share of the retail market, nonintegrated manufacturers will
gradually be frozen out of these markets as the retailers become increasingly
dependent upon the parent firm for supplies; thus the integrated producers
will use their ownership of forward markets to increase their market share at
the manufacturing level.
Actually, there is little factual evidence in the Brown decision to support
the inference that an integration trend threatens the competitive process at the
manufacturing level. The record discloses that, in the period 1950-1956, 1,114
retail stores became subsidiaries of large manufacturers and became increasingly
dependent upon these firms for supplies. Nevertheless, the percentage of shoe
sales of all shoe outlets - not just shoe stores - accounted for by chains of
eleven or more units remained constant from 1948 to 1954. The record shows
that from 1947 to 1958 the number of manufacturers declined from 1,077 to
872; but in the period 1948-1954 there also occurred a substantial decline in
the share of the market held by the top four, eight, and fifteen firms in the
industry. Finally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that only the
largest firms have been integrating forward or that the decline in number of
manufacturing firms is causally connected with the increase in number of out-
lets owned by the manufacturers. If past foreclosures have contributed to an
incipient trend toward oligopoly, they have done so in arcane ways unspecified
by the record.
Though the Brown Court placed special emphasis on trends in its judg-
ment that the merger was illegal, it can be argued that the Court would have
reached a similar conclusion even in the absence of trends. The Court held
that one of the economic and historical forces to be considered is the nature
16 See Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger
Act, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 664 (1961).
17 Stigler, Mergers and Preventiue Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176, 183 (1955).
18 Though the term shoe stores includes separately operated shoe departments of general
stores, it does not include shoe departments of general stores which are not operated as separate
departments; thus the total sales of shoe outlets exceed the total sales of shoe stores. U. S.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, RETAIL TRADE, SINGLE UNITS AND MULTIUNITS, BC58-RS3, at 1.
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and purpose of a vertical arrangement. The Court declared that tying con-
tracts are so inherently anticompetitive that even a small share foreclosed vio-
lates section 3; but certain vertical mergers, the Court argued, may serve a
useful purpose and these Congress wished to immunize from the law.'" The
Court held, however, that the Brown merger did not fall into one of the immune
categories; thus it can be inferred that the foreclosure of the Kinney market
would have been judged illegal even if trends had not been present. Moreover,
the Court likened the merger to a permanent tying contract because Brown
was forcing its shoes on Kinney. Since the Supreme Court has on two occasions
taken what amounts to a per se approach to such contracts,2" the Court's com-
parison of vertical mergers and tying contracts may suggest that all vertical
mergers falling outside the immune categories will be judged illegal.
An evaluation of the various factors considered by the Court points unmis-
takably to one conclusion: the Court did not replace the quantitative substan-
tiality standard of illegality with a rule-of-reason approach to vertical mergers.
The competitive effect of the acquisition (or of past acquisitions) was not
thoroughly analyzed, the small Kinney foreclosure was magnified by being linked
with trends, and the effect of the merger was likened to an inherently anti-
competitive contract. In holding that a market share is seldom determinative,
the Brown Court meant only that other factors such as trends and the purpose
of the merger must be taken into account. This does not imply, however, that
a merger foreclosing a share of the order of magnitude of the Standard Stations
case would be approved; for few foreclosures of this magnitude will fall into
the immune categories of mergers, especially if there is a hint that trends are
at work.
The Brown decision represents a Pyrrhic victory for those who have battled
against quantitative substantiality: a substantial market share foreclosed was
once considered a sufficient condition of illegality under section 7; under the
Brown approach, a substantial share foreclosed is no longer a necessary condi-
tion of illegality.
The Brown-Kinney vertical tie was also found to threaten the competitive
process at the retail level: Chief Justice Warren stated that vertically integrated
outlets have a competitive advantage over their rivals because they can bypass
the wholesaler and purchase in such quantity that they can undersell indepen-
dents; Justice Harlan suggested that manufacturer-owned outlets can sell at a
lower profit margin.
Even if it is granted that there are economies of vertical integration in the
shoe industry - and this writer expresses no opinion on the matter - it is
not likely that these economies are based on the factors cited by the court."'
Bypassing the wholesaler does not eliminate the wholesaling function or its
costs; a vertically integrated retailer will purchase no more or less a quantity
19 See section 4 infra.
20 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947); Northern Pacific Ry.
v. United States, 356 U. S. 1 (1958).
21 Economies of vertical integration are discussed in BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 155-
59 (1959).
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of shoes than a nonintegrated retailer; and lower costs and profit margins are
the means of invigorating competition, not necessarily eliminating it.
The approach taken by the Court suggests that the ban on vertical inte-
gration is virtually complete: if the foreclosure effect is too small to support
a violation and there are no concentration trends, the merger can still be dis-
allowed on the grounds that the cost advantage of a vertically integrated firm
represents a threat to competition in the forward market.22
2. The Horizontal Aspects of the Merger
When Professor Markham surveyed merger cases in 1957, he found that
most of the mergers involved firms whose combined market share exceeded
25 per cent." In 1961, Frederick Rowe's study of merger complaints suggested
that mergers achieving a 15 per cent share of a market where market entry
barriers are high might be in jeopardy.2 If the Brown decision is a reliable
yardstick, horizontal mergers involving a firm with a 5 per cent share of the
market or several firms with a combined share of 5 per cent can now be attacked
under the Clayton Act.22
Prior to the merger (1956) Brown owned 470 shoe stores and controlled
under its franchise system 660 independently owned outlets. At that time, the
acquisition of the 350 Kinney stores gave Brown control of approximately
1600 shoe outlets, or 7.2 per cent of the nation's 22,000 shoe stores and 2.3 per
cent of the nation's total retail shoe outlets, making it the second largest shoe
retailer in the country. Regardless of how impressive, or unimpressive, these
figures are, they are largely irrelevant; for it is the local market, not the nation
as a whole, which is the relevant market for measuring the size and impact of
a merger of retail shoe firms.
The lower court found that there were at least 141 cities of 10,000 or
more population in which Brown and Kinney stores were in competition with
one another. The Supreme Court clearly implied that in 118 of these cities
the merger violated the Clayton Act. In these 118 cities, the combined market
share of Brown and Kinney in one (or more) of the three relevant lines of
commerce ranged from a high of 57.7 per cent to a low of 5 per cent, depend-
ing upon the product line and city. The size of the Kinney market share
acquired by Brown ranged from a high of 36.6 per cent to a low of 1.0 per
cent, but in all cases the combined Brown-Kinney share totaled at least 5 per
cent of one or more of the relevant product lines.
Actually, the Brown market share figures include the sales of the 760
22 The possibility is partly illustrated in the Reynolds Metals Co. vertical merger with
Arrow Brands, Inc., though here the FTC found that competition was actually damaged at
the forward level due to the low prices charged by a firm made powerful by its tie with
Reynolds. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
23 Markham, Merger Policy under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 43 VA. L.
REv. 489, 519 (1957).
24 Rowe, Mergers and the Law: New Directios for the Sixties, 47 A.B.A.J. 1074, 1076
(1961).
25 The decision should allay the fears of those who thought that the decision in United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), offered precedent for
limiting section 7 to firms with a large market share. See Keyes, The Bethlehem-Youngstown
Case and the Market-Share Criterion, 51 A.i. EcoN. REv. 643, 644 (1961).
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outlets which were independently owned but operated under a Brown franchise
system. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's findings that these
outlets were so closely affiliated with Brown that it was appropriate to include
them as Brown stores.2" There is no information in the decision as to the
relative importance - in terms of market share figures - of these independently
owned outlets. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the sales of the outlets
not owned by Brown were sizeable. If this assumption is correct, it must be
concluded that the market shares of the two firms which were legally merged
fell below the 5 per cent figure in some of the markets.
In some of the cities, the merger joined dominant retailers: for example,
in Dodge City, Kansas, Brown outlets accounted for 34.4 per cent of total city
sales of women's shoes in 1955, and Kinney store sales came to 23.3 per cent.
In other markets the shares were small: in St. Paul, Minnesota, Brown outlets
sold 2.5 per cent and Kinney stores 2.7 per cent of total city sales of children's
shoes in 1955. But the Court stated that in a fragmented industry control of
substantial shares - shares of 5 per cent or more - could have a significant
effect on competition, especially in view of industry trends and the competitive
strength of the Brown-Kinney combine.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the industry was in the midst of a
trend toward concentration, a vertical trend which also tended to increase con-
centration in retailing. Curiously, though, little evidence was adduced to sup-
port the existence of a trend other than data on the number of outlets acquired
in recent years by the leading shoe manufacturers, including Brown; in fact,
as pointed out above, some of the evidence flatly contradicted the existence of
a concentration trend. At any rate, the Court was fearful that if it approved
a merger which would push Brown into second place (in terms of retail outlets)
in the industry it might be under pressure to approve other shoe mergers: the
end of such a process would be oligopoly. Thus in the light of concentration
trends, the Brown-Kinney merger, large and small market share alike, achieved
the taint of illegality.
The Court also feared that the combination of even small shares might
threaten the competitive process because of the competitive strength of a "large
national chain." The lower court had held that manufacturer-owned outlets
possessed many advantages: advantages in buying and credit, advertising,
insurance, inventory control and price control.2 The Supreme Court noted
simply that a national chain can protect certain outlets against the "vagaries
of competition" and also alter style sufficiently to present an inventory problem
to the independents. And as pointed out in the previous section, the Court
argued that a vertically integrated shoe firm has several advantages over a
nonintegrated firm.
The Court's approach to horizontal mergers is vulnerable to criticism on
two counts. There is, first of all, the almost complete neglect in the Brown
decision of any analysis of market structure at the retail level. It is true that
in many of the geographic markets involved, the combined market share of the
26 370 U. S. at 337-38 n.66.
27 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. at 738.
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merging firms was sufficiently high to make a detailed market analysis super-
fluous; this was hardly the case in the numerous markets in which the market
share, if judged in terms of previous merger cases, was quite low. The Supreme
Court itself noted with regret the lack of information on concentration and
firm rank in the individual retail markets;2" moreover, evidence concerning
changes in concentration, ease of entry, and the competitive importance of
nonchain outlets would have been relevant and material. It is also regrettable
that the market share figures attributed to the Brown and Kinney outlets refer
to a narrower geographic area than that which was accepted by the court as
the relevant geographic area.29
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Brown objected to the District Court's
findings concerning the horizontal aspect of the merger on the ground that no
attention was given to the impact of the merger in each product line in each
city (the product and geographic markets which the Court found relevant);
for instance, to the anticompetitive effect on the sale of women's shoes in St.
Paul, men's shoes in Council Bluffs, etc. To have required a market analysis
of every product line in every city would have been absurd; to have required
a careful analysis of market structure in several representative markets, including,
of course, a market involving a small merger share, would have been perfectly
reasonable.3 0 The casual approach taken to the most elementary facts concern-
ing market structure makes the Brown case unique among litigated horizontal
merger cases. And if the Brillo Mfg. Co. case illustrates the difficulties involved
in analyzing market structure characteristics and firm conduct,"1 the Brown
case points up the crudity of an approach that neglects the basic market
structure.
The second criticism of the Brown decision is directed at the argument that
a merger, horizontal or vertical, poses a threat to competition because of the
increased efficiency or enhanced strength of the merged firm. This argument
has come to be known as the competitive advantage theory," and it is well on
its way to becoming an integral part of the standard of illegality under section 7.
Professor Adelman found that of the 76 merger complaints issued under section
7 by November 1960, 56 of them emphasized that the merger would enhance
the competitive position of the merging firm or divert trade from other firms.3 3
The Brown decision guarantees the survival of the competitive advantage theory.
As far as the Brown-Kinney merger is concerned, this writer is not compe-
tent to judge whether the merger would increase or decrease the efficiency or
28 370 U. S. at 346 n.74.
29 As pointed out in the next section, the court held that the relevant market was every
city of 10,000 population or more and its immediate contiguous territory in which Brown and
Kinney stores operated. The market share figures cited above are based on city sales alone.
See 370 U. S. at 341-42 n.69.
30 The lack of supporting data on industry trends and the failure to use several market
samples attest to the embryonic development of statistical evidence in antitrust cases. The topic
is explored in MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY ch. ix (1962).
31 Brillo Mfg. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1962 FTC Cas.) 1 15772 (1962). The
difficulties of applying orthodox merger theory in the Brillo case are ably discussed by Bok.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. R.v. 226,
258-69 (1960).
32 Bork, supra note 15, at 838.
33 Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 Am. ECON. REv. 236, 238 (1961).
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competitive strength of the firm. But there are a number of objections (pre-
scinding entirely from the facts of the Brown case) to making the increased
competitive strength of the merged firm an essential part of the standard of
illegality of section 7. In the first place, some of the merger advantages cited
in some of the merger complaints- the opportunity to price discriminate, for
example-turn out to be putative violations of other laws-the Robinson-
Patman Act, for example -and these should be attacked by laws specifically
aimed at such practices rather than by the antimerger law.34 Secondly, though
there may be genuine efficiencies gained from a merger, the evidence to support
the alleged advantages tends to be unreliable: the testimony of small business-
men can be counted on to exaggerate the advantages possessed by integrated
units and genuine cost studies are usually unavailable. At best, then, the evi-
dence can only be suggestive.
A more fundamental objection to the competitive advantage theory, grant-
ing that some integrations increase efficiency, is that a finding of violation on
grounds of competitive advantages will not for long protect the nonintegrated
smaller firm: sooner or later these firms must integrate or succumb to those
firms which become more efficient by nonmerger integration. It is simply futile
to attempt to preserve competition by protecting firms from competitive pres-
sures exerted by more efficient firms.
Finally, the too ready acceptance of the competitive advantage theory
will tend to deflect the attention of the prosecuting agencies and the judiciary
from other matters, matters more related to the substance of the problem.
Why bother to define the market, to calculate shares, to compute past and
present concentration ratios, or to analyze entry problems. These are difficult
matters to handle, all the more because of the tentativeness of merger theory
and the scantiness of the data; and these matters are largely irrelevant if com-
petitive advantage is itself considered anticompetitive. The temptation will be
to side-step these issues, to avoid them because of the messiness of the analysis,
particularly since the whole matter can be resolved so simply on the basis of
an approach that is so readily accessible and believable. The easy victories will
have their long run costs, however: support for the antitrust laws, a fragile
support at best, will surely be weakened if one of the laws is centered on the
idea that reduced costs, improved services, or lower profit margins constitute
the essence of an antitrust violation.
Undoubtedly, the most significant aspect of the Brown decision is that
the antimerger law has been expanded to encompass small horizontal mergers.
The key question is whether the merger of firms each of which has a small
market share, say two or three per cent, represents a threat to competition. It
is doubtful that one can demonstrate in economic theory that the elimination
of such a small part of the market significantly reduces the number of seller
alternatives or gives the combined firm any power to set industry price. Perhaps
this difficulty accounts for the important role which is given, in the Brown
decision, to industry trends and the competitive advantages of mergers. Be
34 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Borden Go., Complaint (mimeographed) at 7-8. (FTC
Docket No. 6652, Oct. 16, 1956).
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that as it may, it would be unfortunate, and certainly a break from past preced-
ents, if in expanding the scope of the law to cover small mergers the focus of
the law is shifted from market structure to industry trends and competitive
advantage.
3. The Relevant Market
The most unsettled issue in antitrust case law is market definition. The
approach to the market has varied from court to court, case to case, merger
type to merger type, and antitrust law to antitrust law. The Brown decision,
unfortunately, does not resolve the thorny legal and economic issues.
Product definitions based on reasonable interchangeability, peculiar char-
acteristics and uses, and production flexibility have been tirelessly submitted,
rejected, ignored, distinguished, and equated; and a review of the decisions
reveals a singular absence of pattern in the treatment of substitute products.
In the du Pont-General Motors case, the Court held, however, that a product
-in this case automobile paints and fabrics- having peculiar characteristics
or uses represents a line of commerce under the Clayton Act;3" subsequently,
in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. it was suggested that the existence
of substitutes may be ignored in a Clayton Act case, even though they are
germane in a Sherman Act proceeding. 6 The final stage in this line of reasoning
occurred in two recent cases: products (Census coarse paper and polyethylene
film) were found to have peculiar characteristics and uses on the grounds that
consumers indicate the distinctiveness of the product by purchasing it. 7 If
carried to extremes, this approach becomes a Chamberlinian nightmare in
which every firm is a pure monopolist and every nonvertical merger is con-
glomerate.
The approach to the geographic market has been no less disturbing: the
Bethlehem Court found relevant markets within relevant markets;38 a Federal
Trade Commission complaint alleged that a merger between steel fabricators
threatened to lessen competition in several markets, including Maricopa County,
Arizona;3 9 and in a recent case, it was argued that the market consisted of
eight unconnected semicircles, six with a radius of twelve miles and two with
a radius of five miles."0
The Brown Court held that reasonable interchangeability or cross-elasticity
of demand marks off the outer boundaries of a product market; but within
these boundaries there may be submarkets or subproducts based on peculiar
characteristics or uses, distinct customers, or distinct prices, inter alia, and these
submarkets may, in themselves, constitute relevant lines of commerce for anti-
trust purposes.
35 United States v. B. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 593-95 (1957).
36 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 593-94 n. 36 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
37 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961); Union Carbide Corp.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. (1961 FTC Cas.) 15503, at 20372 (FTC Order, Sept. 25, 1961).
38 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. at 603; see Adelman, supra note
33, at 237.
39 In the Matter of Kaiser Steel Corp., Complaint (mimeographed) at 4. (FTC Docket
No. 8227, June 27, 1960).
40 Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
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The Court agreed with the District Court that the broad product "shoes"
should be divided into three lines of commerce: men's, women's, and children's
shoes. Such a division, the Court stated, was dictated by each category's
peculiar characteristics and distinctive customers and the evidence concerning
factory specialization. Brown argued that this classification ignores differences
in quality and price, ignores the fact that the shoes it manufactures are in
the medium price brackets and the shoes Kinney sells 'are in the low price
brackets. The Supreme Court refused to admit that such price/quality sub-
markets exist within each category: to agree that shoes selling at a price below
$8.99 do not compete with shoes selling for $9.00 or more. The Court pointed
out, however, that in some cases price and quality differences may have to be
recognized in defining a market. Some will note the inconsistency between the
Court's refusal to accept quality submarkets and the decision in Spalding & Bros.
v. FTC, where higher priced baseballs were held to constitute a separate line
of commerce4 ' Of course, there is no necessary inconsistency: it is simply a
question of fact as to whether competition does or does not exist among given
products.
The decision may revive interest in the production flexibility approach to
market definition. According to this approach, the relevant market should be
defined broadly enough to include capacity capable of switching from one
product to another; thus if plants turning out men's shoes can easily be con-
verted to women's shoes, the relevant line of commerce should not be restricted
to men's shoes. In two previous cases, a production flexibility approach to the
definition of the market was rejected because the facts did not show that plant
flexibility actually occurred;2 moreover, both courts strongly intimated that
production flexibility is not relevant in a horizontal merger case.43
In the Brown decision, the Supreme Court noted that production flexibility
may be an important factor in defining a market in vertical integration cases,-
though the evidence in the case at bar indicated a lack of flexibility.44 Unfortu-
nately, it is not clear whether the Court intended to restrict the relevance of
the flexibility theory to vertical merger cases, a restriction suggested in the
Bethlehem case. Such a restriction can be defended only if the focus of the
law is to be centered on the fortunes of the7 producers." If the task, though,
is to define a market in which the impact of the merger on competition is to
be judged, the exclusion of capacity which can easily be converted will tend
41 A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc., v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962). See Handler &
Robinson, supra note 16, at 649.
42 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 592; Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769, 805 (1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
43 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. at 592-93 n. 34; Crown Zellerbach
Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d at 813 (9th Cir. 1961).
44 See 370 U. S. at 325 n.42. But Justice Harlan argued in his separate opinion that, in
fact, the production flexibility of Brown's manufacturing plants, e.g., that a plant may be
shifted without undue difficulty from the production of children's shoes to men's shoes, sup-
ports the conclusion that the shoe market as a whole, rather than the separate product lines,
represents the relevant line of commerce with respect to the vertical aspects of the merger.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. at 366-68.
45 See Mann & Lewyn, The Relevant Market under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New
Cases-Two Different Views, 47 VA. L. REv. .1014, 1019 (1961).
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to understate the relative size of the market."6 To gauge the true relative size
of a merger, the market must be realistically defined, and this may require
recognition of the existence of flexible capacity in horizontal as well as vertical
merger cases.
The definition of the relevant section of the country involved in Brown
also raised problems. All parties agreed that the country as a whole represented
the relevant geographic market for judging the anticompetitive effect of the
vertical aspect of the merger and of the horizontal merger of Brown's and
Kinney's manufacturing facilities. The relevant geographic market in which
to examine the horizontal aspects at the retail level was not so easily determined.
The lower court had held that the relevant market was every city of 10,000
population or more (Kinney didn't operate in any cities under 10,000) and
its immediate contiguous surrounding territory in which Brown and Kinney
retail outlets competed. In its appeal, Brown argued that the geographic mar-
kets should be determined individually according to the peculiar, varying
circumstances of retailing in each locality; that in some cases the market should
be restricted to the central business area, and in other cases the market should
be expanded to cover a "standard metropolitan area."4 7 The Supreme Court
ruled that the record supported the lower court's broad findings: shoe stores in
the outskirts of a city do compete with downtown stores but the competition be-
tween these stores and stores located beyond the outskirts is not significant.
Unfortunately, the Brown decision does not provide the courts with clear-
cut guidelines governing the question of market definition. On the one hand,
the Court distinguished the outer from the inner boundaries of a market and
stated that a merger is illegal if there is an anticompetitive impact in any sub-
market; on the other hand, the Court refused in the case at bar to divide the
three lines of shoes into quality or type submarkets and stated that the market
must be drawn broadly enough "to recognize competition where, in fact, com-
petition exists.""8 These dicta are not necessarily inconsistent: the Court may
merely be saying that competitive realities determine the boundaries of the
product and geographic market, that in some cases quality differences or loca-
tional differences may serve to separate markets but in other cases such dif-
ferences may not be significant.
The problem is that some courts will find in the former dictum an authoriza-
tion to approve of any submarket definition provided there is some evidence
that the submarket is distinctive."9 Other courts, however, may require the
proposer of a narrow submarket definition to demonstrate, according to the
latter Brown dictum, that the submarket is not drawn in such a way as to
46 KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 134 (1959).
47 The Bureau of Census defines a standard metropolitan area as the integrated economic
area centered around a city of 50,000 population or more. See II U. S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF BUSINESS: 1954, at 3.
48 370 U. S. at 326.
49 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, relying on the Brown criteria, held
in a recent case that florist foil represented the relevant line of commerce. The court ruled
that florist foil has distinct prices and customers and is recognized as a distinct entity, even
though the evidence did not show that florist foil had qualities or uses which distinguished it
from other decorative foil products. Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
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exclude competitive products and suppliers. There is no escape from the con-
clusion that either interpretation is tenable in terms of the Brown decision.
A recent article defended the use of a narrow approach to market definition
under the Clayton Act on the ground that this represents one of the means by
which the judiciary can implement the clear desire of Congress to prevent
mergers that would be legal under the Sherman Act." Others may argue that
a narrow approach to markets is justified in terms of the incipiency doctrine:
to prevent eventual damage in the broad market each submarket must be de-
fended regardless of whether the submarket is meaningful in itself. Of course, this
is one way of tightening the antitrust laws, but at the expense of inconsistency, un-
certainty and the charge of gerrymandering.5 ' These problems can be avoided or
at least minimized if the market is defined realistically in terms of all effective
product and supplier substitutes. Thus the problem of choosing a broad or
narrow definition of the market, from either the demand or supply side, should
be resolved, however difficult it may be, by a consideration of the facts of the
market. As Professor Adelman put it: "It is a pathetic illusion that the market
is whatever the courts choose to call it. The market, like the weather, is simply
there .. 2
The lowering of the merger-achieved market share which is vulnerable
under section 7 serves to make the market definition less crucial in one respect
and more crucial in another. Since the law now proscribes mergers involving only
a small share, there is no longer a necessity on the part of the prosecution to
fashion or contrive a market definition- product or geographic- that makes
the merger-achieved share loom large;" on the other hand, since the law now
applies to even small merger shares, it is all the more imperative in terms of
justice that the market be defined in realistic and defensible terms.
4. The Eye of the Needle
It is tempting to urge that the Brown case is sui generis: to say that the
case is a curio because it involves the combination of a vertical and a horizontal
merger of two large chains which operate in numerous retail markets. Such
a unique combination, it can be argued, will hardly serve as precedent. There
are important reasons, however, for believing that the approach taken by the
Supreme Court foreshadows an even stricter judicial posture toward mergers
than in the past.
The Brown Court pointed out, not once but several times, that there are
three types of mergers which Congress wished to immunize from section 7:
mergers of de minimus proportions, mergers involving a failing company, and
mergers involving small firms whose purpose in merging is to compete better
50 Martin, The Bethlehem-Youngstown Case and the Market-Share Criterion: Comment,
52 Am,. ECON. REv. 522, 525 (1962).
51 Justice Harlan pointed out that the phrase "in any line of commerce" in the 'Clayton
Act is not an authorization to the government to define the market as narrowly or broadly as
suits its case. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. at 367-68 & n.3.
52 Adelman, supra note 33, at 237.
53 Lucile Keyes suggested that lowering the market share would be one way of getting
around the reasonable interchangeability of substitutes test of the Cellophane case (United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & 'Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956))in section 7 cases, supra note
25, at 646.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
with larger rivals. The implication is unmistakable that all other mergers are
presumed to violate the law. Apparently, the Court regards an increase in
concentration, resulting from a merger involving a substantial share, as tan-
tamount to a substantial lessening of competition or tendency to monopoly.
The emphasis on concentration rather than damage to the competitive
process is evident throughout the decision. In brushing aside Brown's argument
that the many-firm shoe industry is competitive, the Court stated that "remaining
vigor cannot immunize a merger if the trend in that industry is toward oligop-
oly."54 Again, the Court observed, "We cannot avoid the mandate of Congress
that tendencies toward concentration in industry are to be curbed in their in-
cipiency.. . ."" And in another passage the Court declared that Congress de-
sired "to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses." 6 The ineluctable conclusion is that tendency toward con-
centration has become the gravamen of section 7.
Finally, there is the case itself: small merger shares, trends, and competitive
advantage. This formula is sufficiently elastic to cover most mergers." How
many industries are there which have not experienced a trend toward con-
centration, especially if a trend is variably defined in terms of a decrease in
the number of firms or an increase in the share of the market held by the top
10, 50, or 100 firms in the last 5, 25, or 60 years? And even- if trends are
not discernible, the merger can be disallowed to prevent a chain reaction
toward concentration; moreover, the competitive advantage of a merging firm
will appear to be even more dangerous if the other firms have not availed them-
selves, in the past, of the benefits of expansion or integration. The competitive
advantage doctrine can also be applied to conglomerate mergers if the adopted
industry includes small or nonintegrated firms. 8 Thus if future courts employ
the combination of trends or competitive advantage and small merger shares
in a narrowly defined market, few mergers, outside the immune categories,
will pass muster.
Conclusion
The Brown decision will provoke heavy criticism. In holding that the
combination of small horizontal shares and the foreclosure of an even smaller
share violate the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court is vulnerable to the charge
that it did not rest its findings on probable damage to competition. It will be
argued that trends are irrelevant: that if the firm at bar is relatively small,
it will not have the power to set prices; thus whatever the trends, the merger
54 370 U. S. at 333.
55 Id. at 346.
56 Id. at 344.
57 The Brown case provides a tailor-made precedent for a number of pending complaints
against the dairy and .grocery industries. There is one major difference: the problem of relief
will be more troublesome since these cases involve a series of mergers rather than a single
acquisition. This difficulty was not faced in the recent Foremost Dairy case since the FTC
refused to condemn the entire series of acquisitions by Foremost. See Foremost Dairies, Inc.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. (1962 FTC Cas.) 15877 (April 30, 1962).
58 Kintner, The Federal Trade Commission in 1960-Apologia Pro Vita Nostra, reprinted
in SALES AND PRICING POLICIES UNDER THE-ANTITRUST LAWS 38-39 (1961). The potential
anticompetitive effects of a conglomerate merger are discussed in Clark, Conglomerate Mergers
and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 255 (1961).
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of small firms will not harm competition. According to some, it is unlikely that
a market share below, say, 20 per cent confers any economic power, especially
if market entry barriers are low.59 Moreover, if integration increases the efficiency
of the Brown-Kinney firm, this will serve to strengthen, not damage, the com-
petitive process at both the manufacturing and retailing level. The Court will
be accused of protecting competitors rather than competition and of attempting
to secure a political goal - large numbers of independent firms - by means of
a law which specifically condemns only those mergers that impair the competitive
process.
The above view will be held by many lawyers and economists and there
is much in the Supreme Court decision to support the interpretation. But such
an interpretation may be too harsh. A merger law which prevents only those
mergers achieving a 20 per cent control would serve well to debar a firm from
using the merger route to achieve economic power; it would not prevent the
formation of oligopoly by merger. And on the whole a case can be made that
the greater the number of seller alternatives the more potentially competitive
the market. According to this view, the antimerger net must be sufficiently
broad to prevent the creation of oligopoly, an objective clearly intended by
the Congress. It follows, then, that substantial market shares and changes in
concentration ratios are highly relevant matters to a consideration of whether
competitive markets are being transformed into oligopolies. To ignore such
factors would leave society vulnerable to a further increase in the already
substantial level of industry concentration.6"
The Brown decision, nevertheless, offers some unfortunate precedents:
vertical mergers were treated as an essentially anticompetitive arrangement;
concentration trends were accepted without the benefit of probative data; and
analysis of market structure was neglected in favor of trends and competitive
advantage. Though the Court denied that the Clayton Act was intended to
protect individual competitors from hard competition,"' the Court's approach
came perilously close to doing just that.
The Brown decision is important law. The decision expanded the scope
of section 7 to encompass small mergers, rejected the quantitative substantiality
test in vertical arrangement cases, sanctioned the relevance of trends and com-
petitive advantage, and shifted, however subtly, the gravamen of section 7
from damage to competition to tendency toward concentration.
The essential question, however, remains to be answered: will the basic
structure of industry and the level of concentration be significantly influenced
by an effective antimerger law?
59 In framing a test to outlaw mergers that create market "power or increase it, Kaysen
and Turner argue that horizontal mergers with a combined share of 20 per cent and substantial
vertical acquisitions by a firm with a 20 per cent share of the market should be held prima
facie illegal. They suggest that the legality of smaller mergers should turn on other factors,
such as high barriers of entry. They are, of course, not necessarily identified with the view
presented above. KAYSEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 132-33.
60 Recent studies on industry concentration in the U. S. include the following:
STAFF OF Suacorms. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY, SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 85TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., CONCENTRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1957); Collins & Preston, The Size
Structure of the Largest Industrial Firms, 1909-1958, 51 Ai. ECON. REv. 986 (1961); STAFF
OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, op. cit. supra note 4.
61 370 U. S. at 344.
